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NEWS GATHERING, INTANGIBLE PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND 900-LINE TELEPHONE SERVICES: ONE
COURT MAKES A BAD CONNECTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Pay-per-call services, commonly known as 900-number telephone
lines, or "900-lines," are rapidly becoming a multi-billion dollar industry
by providing callers with services that range from diet tips to horoscope
predictions to sexually explicit conversations.' In the recent case New
Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc.2 ("New Kids"), U.S.
District Judge William J. Rea ruled that the news media have a constitu-
tional right to use 900-numbers to make money while gathering news.'
The case is believed to be the first to rule that such news gathering may
be immunized by the first amendment from claims of trademark infringe-
ment and misappropriation of right to publicity.4
The common law right to publicity doctrine protects an individual's
pecuniary interest in his or her name or likeness.' The doctrine grants a
public figure a monopoly in the commercial exploitation of his or her
own persona.6 Similarly, the Lanham Act7 protects the holder of a valid
trademark from any commercial use of the mark in relation to goods or
services by another which is likely to cause confusion or mistake, or to
deceive as to the origin of such goods or services.8
Both the right to publicity doctrine and the Lanham Act protect
intangible property rights.9 The scope of protection afforded to intangi-
1. Declaration of Rick Parkhill in Support of Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Au-
thorities in Opposition to Defendant Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc.'s Motion for
Summary Judgment at 2, New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 745 F.
Supp. 1540 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (No.CV 90-1378 WJR (JRx)). Rick Parkhill is the publisher of
InfoText Publishing. Inc., a trade journal for the audio text industry. Id. at 1.
2. 745 F. Supp. 1540 (C.D. Cal. 1990). This case is actually the result of the combination
of two companion cases, each brought by New Kids against separate defendants, News
America Publishing, Inc. and Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc.
3. Los Angeles Daily Journal, Sept. 11, 1990, at 1, col. 4, citing New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at
1547.
4. Los Angeles Daily Journal, Sept. 11, 1990, at I, col. 4.
5. J. MCCARTHY, RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY & PRIVACY § 4.9 at 4-48-49 (1989). See also
Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
6. Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1980).
8. Id.
9. See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 405 (8th Cir. 1987) (trademark
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ble property rights is limited, however, by the operation of the first
amendment.1 o Prior to New Kids, courts applied a balancing test set out
in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,1I ("Lloyd"), to determine when property rights
must yield to first amendment concerns in the area of news gathering and
news dissemination.
12
In New Kids, the District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia distinguished the Lloyd test 3 and extended the scope of news gather-
ing protected by the first amendment to include 900-number telephone
opinion polls conducted about the plaintiffs, the popular musical group,
New Kids on the Block by two newspaper periodicals, Star Magazine
and USA Today.14 In doing so, the court determined that such use of the
plaintiffs' trademark 5 and persona by the defendant newspapers was im-
mune from trademark infringement and misappropriation under the first
amendment.16 Unfortunately, the court incorrectly interpreted precedent
and applied contorted reasoning to reach its conclusion. Furthermore,
the court erred by employing a single line of reasoning for the resolution
is a form of intangible property that conveys or symbolizes ideas); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1978) (analogizing the right of publicity to patent and
copyright law); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 288, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
aff'd. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied 440 U.S. 908 (1979) (Elvis Presley's assigned
right of publicity descends at death like any other intangible property).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See infra text accompanying notes 11-16.
11. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
12. The Supreme Court found that property rights need not "yield to the exercise of First
Amendment rights under circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of communication
exist." Lloyd, 407 U.S. 551, 566-67. See, e.g., Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d
397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 933 (1988) (first amendment does not bar an
action for trademark infringement where other media of expression are available to the defend-
ant); Reddy Communications, Inc. v. Environmental Action Foundation, Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 630, 634 (D.D.C. 1977) (first amendment does not require plaintiff's trademark rights
to yield where defendant could express views through other avenues); Sid and Marty Krofft
Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1170 (9th Cir. 1977) (copyright claim not
barred by the first amendment because copyright law protects particular expression of ideas
leaving other expressions of the idea available). But see, e.g., Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping
Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74, 85
(1980) (California Supreme Court declined to use the "alternative avenues of communication
test" developed in Lloyd, to rule that property rights of shopping center owner to exclude
students soliciting support for political cause must yield to state constitution-based free speech
rights of students). See infra notes 192-220 and accompanying text.
13. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1544-45.
14. Id. at 1547.
15. The plaintiffs' trademark, service mark and trade name is "New Kids on the Block."
Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant Gannett Satel-
lite Information Network, Inc.'s Motion For Summary Judgment at 1, New Kids on the Block
v. News America Publishing Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1540 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (No. CV 90-1378 WJR
(JRx)).
16. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1541-42.
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of the two separate actions brought by New Kids against the two defend-
ants. This is because the claims against Star Magazine were factually
distinguishable from the claims against USA Today in a constitutionally
significant way."
This Note analyzes the New Kids decision in light of contrary prece-
dent. It also examines the court's decision to incorporate the two sepa-
rate cases comprising New Kids into a single decision. Next, this Note
explores the potential conflict between first amendment rights and intan-
gible property rights which would result if the reasoning employed in
New Kids is adopted by other courts. Finally, this Note suggests an alter-
native analysis equally protective of first amendment freedoms as that
adopted by the court in New Kids but without unduly constricting intan-
gible property rights.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: NEW KIDS ON THE BLOCK V.
NEWS AMERICA PUBLISHING, INC.
On February 7, 1990, Gannett Satellite Information Network, In-
corporated, doing business as the daily newspaper, USA Today ("USA
Today"), advertised a 900-number New Kids' hotline. 8 The advertise-
ment included a photograph of the New Kids and carried the bold type
query "WHO'S THE BEST ON THE BLOCK?"' 9 The survey further
inquired "Which of the five is your fave? Or are they a turn off?" 2' The
advertisement invited readers to call and vote for their favorite New Kid
at a cost of fifty cents per call.2 '
On March 6, 1990, News America Publications Incorporated, doing
17. See infra notes 166-168 and accompanying text.
18. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1542. According to the plaintiffs, sponsors of 900-line hot-
lines, such as Star Magazine and the New Kids, arrange with service providers such as tele-
phone companies to offer 900-line services. Consumers purchase the service provided by
calling the numbers. The services can range from diet tips to sexually-explicit conversations.
The cost of the calls generally range from $.50 to $5.00 billed per minute or per call. The
charges incurred appear on the caller's phone bill. Profits from the operation of 900-line serv-
ices are shared between the sponsor and the service provider. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant News America Publishing, Inc.'s Motion
for Summary Judgment at 4, New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 745 F.
Supp. 1540 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (No. CV 90-1378 WJR (JRx)).
19. New Kids; 745 F. Supp. at 1542.
20. Id.
21. USA Today, Feb. 7, 1990 at 1 col. 1. It is important to note that in its opinion the New
Kids court erroneously cites a "per minute" rather than "per call" basis for determining the
900-line charge. 745 F. Supp. at 1542. The court's failure to note this distinction is critical
because any time a "voter" spends on a 900-line beyond the time the caller takes to vote is
arguably not related to news gathering and hence beyond the reasoning of the court. See infra
notes 140-165 and accompanying text.
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business as Star Magazine ("Star Magazine"), also advertised a 900-
number New Kids hotline.22 Like USA Today's advertisement, Star
Magazine's advertisement also included a photograph of the New Kids
and contained a solicitation inviting readers to call and "vote" for the
sexiest New Kid.23 The advertised cost of the call was ninety-five cents
per minute. 24 In contrast to USA Today's 900-line, Star Magazine's 900-
line invited callers to participate in "Star's entertainment trivia game"
while the caller was on the New Kids line.25
The pop group has used the New Kids trademark to identify its
goods and services since 1986.26 Two 900-number telephone hotlines
were among the New Kids' services using the New Kids mark at the time
the defendants' articles were published.2 ' New Kids claimed that the use
of their mark in connection with the defendants' 900-lines was a com-
mercial, profit-oriented venture that infringed on their trademark.28 The
plaintiffs contended that defendants' New Kids surveys were merely dis-
guised advertisements for the sale of collateral commercial products in
the form of 900-line services.29 New Kids further argued that Star Maga-
zine and USA Today could have used a toll free "800" prefix line or
regular toll phone lines to conduct their surveys.3° Instead, New Kids
claimed that the defendants chose 900-lines to commercially misappro-
priate the goodwill created by the New Kids and to capitalize on the
public's familiarity with the goods and services identified by the New
Kids mark.3"
New Kids brought eleven causes of action against both defendants
claiming federal and state statutory and common law infringement; dilu-
tion of trademark, service mark and trade name; and commercial misap-
propriation.32 The group based their infringement claims on the theory
22. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1542.
23. Id.
24. Id. Note that the charges on Star's 900-line are "per minute" in contrast to USA's per
call system. This is significant for the reasons raised supra note 21.
25. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1542.
26. Id. at 1543.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1543.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1542. See infra notes 33-34 for the first through tenth claims. The eleventh
claim, was for the remedy of a constructive trust which the court deemed to be dependent
upon the disposition of the other causes of action. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1543 n.3. A claim
for dilution of the New Kids trademark was disputed by the court because the plaintiffs failed
to specifically "cite the California Business and Professions Code § 14330, but stated in para-
graph 6 of the complaint that defendants "threaten to dilute" plaintiffs' mark." Id. at 1542 n. 1.
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that the defendants disseminated false or misleading information which
was likely to confuse the public regarding the relationship between the
New Kids' and the defendants' 900-number services.33 The misappropri-
ation claims were based on the theory that the defendants' reference to
the New Kids in their 900-number advertisements constituted a misap-
propriation of their publicity rights.34
New Kids moved for summary judgment, alleging that the defend-
ants had infringed their intangible property rights and were not shielded
by the first amendment.3" Star Magazine and USA Today also moved for
summary judgment on the grounds that the New Kids' claims were
barred, as a matter of law.36 The defendants argued that their 900-lines
were used for news gathering and dissemination and, as such, were con-
stitutionally protected under the first amendment.37
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
The New Kids court determined that the resolution of the single is-
sue of whether the first amendment barred all of New Kids' claims was
dispositive of the case.38 Starting with New Kids' trademark infringe-
ment claim, the court dismissed the New Kids' argument that the proper
test to evaluate intangible property rights in relation to the first amend-
ment is the test outlined in Lloyd.39
In Lloyd, the United States Supreme Court held that the first
amendment rights of protesters were not violated when the owner of a
shopping center prohibited distribution of anti-war pamphlets on his
premises.' The Lloyd Court used a two-step test to arrive at this con-
clusion.4" First, the Court considered whether the content of the com-
33. Id. at 1542. The following claims fit under this theory: common law trademark in-
fringement (first claim); Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a),("Lanham
Act") false advertising (second claim); Lanham Act false designation of origin (third claim);
Lanham Act unfair competition (fourth claim); trade name infringement (seventh claim), false
advertising under CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (eighth claim); and unfair competition
under CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 and § 17500 (ninth claim). Id. at n.2.
34. Id. at 1542-43. The following claims fit under this theory: commercial misappropria-
tion under CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (fifth claim); common law misappropriation (sixth claim);
and interference with prospective economic advantage (tenth claim). Id. at 1543 n.3.
35. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1543.
36. Id.
37. Id
38. Id. The court did not address "whether the New Kids have established, as a matter of
law, defendants' liability for infringement or misappropriation." Id.
39. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1541, 1543.
40. Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 571.
41. See infra text accompanying footnotes 42-45.
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munication at issue was being censored.42 In Lloyd, the Court found that
the pamphlet distribution restriction did not discriminate on the basis of
the content of the pamphlet.43 Next, the Lloyd Court balanced the
protesters' first amendment rights against the property owner's right to
exclude others from his property.' The Court concluded that property
rights need not "yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under
circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of communication
exist."
,4 5
The court in New Kids, however, determined that the appropriate
analysis was not that of the United States Supreme Court in Lloyd but
instead that of the second circuit in Rogers v. Grimaldi46 ("Rogers").47
In Rogers, the plaintiff, dancer Ginger Rogers, brought an action against
the producers and distributors of a motion picture for the use of the title
"Ginger and Fred."4 The defendant producers' film was a story about
two fictional Italian cabaret performers who imitated Ginger Rogers and
Fred Astaire and became known as "Ginger and Fred."49 Rogers sought
permanent injunctive relief and money damages alleging that the use of
"Ginger and Fred" for the film's title constituted a violation of the Lan-
ham Act and infringement of her common law right of publicity.5" In
Rogers, the court held that "the First Amendment did not provide abso-
lute immunity to works of artistic expression because of the legitimate
government concern regarding consumer deception."51 Nevertheless, the
Rogers court reasoned that first amendment concerns must inform judi-
cial consideration of the scope of the Lanham Act when applied to claims
involving film titles.5 2 The court stated that the Lanham Act:
should be construed to apply to artistic works only where the
public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the
public interest in free expression ... In the context of allegedly
misleading titles using a celebrity's name, that balance will nor-
mally not support application of the Act unless the title has no
artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it
has some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads
42. Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 564.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 566-67.
45. Id. at 567.
46. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
47. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1541, 1543.
48. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 996.
49. Id. at 996-97.
50. Id. at 997.
51. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1544 (citing Rogers, 875 F.2d at 997).
52. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 998.
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as to the source or the content of the work.53
The court in New Kids noted the Rogers decision as a narrowing of
the scope of the Lanham Act when first amendment concerns are impli-
cated.54 In addition, the New Kids court further noted that the Rogers
court specifically rejected Ginger Rogers' request to apply the "no alter-
native avenues of communication" standard developed in Lloyd, because
the Lloyd standard did not sufficiently accommodate the public's interest
in free expression.5"
The court in New Kids acknowledged that the Rogers case only ad-
dressed the role of first amendment values in the specific context of artis-
tic expression. 56 Nevertheless, the New Kids court deemed that "the
First Amendment plays the same central role regarding news gathering
and dissemination."57 To bolster this contention the court cited cases
affirming that news gathering is protected speech,58 that exit polling is
protected news gathering,59 and that news gathering is not commercial
speech.60
After deciding that an application of the Rogers test was appropriate
for cases addressing news gathering, the court used the reasoning in Rog-
ers to conclude that "the Lanham Act will not prohibit the use of the
New Kids trademark unless the defendants explicitly and falsely denoted
authorship, sponsorship, or endorsement by the New Kids or explicitly
mislead [sic] as to content."'6  The court found that the evidence
presented by both USA Today and Star Magazine supported their claims
that the use of the New Kids trademark was related to news gathering
and dissemination. 62 The court reached this conclusion even though it
acknowledged that Star Magazine's case was distinguishable from USA
Today's because Star Magazine took the opportunity to solicit the
caller's participation in its entertainment trivia game, a separate 900-
53. Id. at 999 (footnote omitted).
54. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1544 (quoting Rogers, 875 F.2d at 998).
55. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1544 (quoting Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999).
56. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1544.
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. Id., (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) and Daily Herald Co. v.
Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 384 (9th Cir. 1988)).
59. Id. at 1544 n.4. ("See Nicholson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 177 Cal. App. 3d. 509,
223 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1986) ("First Amendment therefore bars interference with this traditional
function of a free press in seeking out information by asking questions."); Clean-Up '84 v.
Heinrich, 759 F.2d 1511 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (holding that a state statute interfering with the news
gathering activity of taking voter exit polls was unconstitutional).
60. Id., (citing Daily Herald v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 384 n.4 (9th Cir. 1988)).
61. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1545.
62. Id.
19911
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number service.63 The court found that both Star Magazine and USA
Today represented that they conducted the 900-number survey merely to
find out which member of the New Kids was the public's favorite, and
concluded that the results were newsworthy."
The court then determined that for the Lanham Act to apply, the
New Kids plaintiffs had the burden of providing evidence that the defend-
ants' uses of their trademark were misleading as to content or that Star
Magazine or USA Today falsely and explicitly denoted authorship, spon-
sorship or endorsement by the plaintiffs.65 The court ruled that this bur-
den was not met because New Kids relied on the theory of implicit
endorsement.66 The court held that "[t]he risk that some people might
think that the New Kids implicitly endorsed or sponsored the Star Maga-
zine's and USA Today's 900-number services is outweighed by the dan-
ger of restricting news gathering and dissemination. "67
The court distinguished Cher v. Forum Int'l, Ltd.68 ("Cher") to sup-
port its conclusion that a showing of implicit endorsement is insuffi-
cient.69 In Cher, the performer sued Forum magazine for use of
headlines, cover promotions and advertising in connection with pub-
lished interviews she had given.70 Cher contended that the magazine
falsely created and exploited the impression that Cher had given an ex-
clusive interview directly to Forum when she had not, and that the maga-
zine had exploited Cher's celebrity value to sell magazines without her
consent by implying that she endorsed Forum.71 The Cher court upheld
the trier of fact's finding that Cher had demonstrated implied endorse-
ment and had stated a claim for appropriation of publicity.72 The court
in New Kids distinguished Cher, however, by contending that Cher was
an appropriation of publicity case while New Kids was a Lanham Act
case.73 The New Kids court also noted that even if allegations of implied
endorsement were sufficient under the Lanham Act, no genuine issue of
fact was raised by the plaintiffs.74 The court stated that the Cher defend-
ants published false statements, whereas in New Kids, the defendants'
63. Id. at 1545 n.5.
64. Id. at 1545.
65. Id.
66. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1545.
67. Id. See also Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1000.
68. 692 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1120 (1983).
69. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1545 n.6.
70. Cher, 692 F.2d at 637.
71. Id. at 638.
72. Id. at 639-40.
73. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1545 n.6.
74. Id.
[Vol. I11
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claim of implied endorsement was premised on the fact that the polling
solicitation was in the defendants' publications. 75
Citing Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Ideal Publishing Corp. 76 ("Uni-
versal "), the court rejected the New Kids contention that mere publica-
tion of the solicitation in their publications was sufficient to state a cause
of action for implied endorsement. 71 In Universal, a merchandiser hold-
ing a license to exploit the trademark "Hardy Boys" sued the publisher
of Teen Beat magazine for trademark infringement for publishing a sou-
venir issue which was composed of articles about and photos of the stars
of the television series "Hardy Boys."' 78 The Universal court found that
the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the public would tend to associate
Teen Beat magazine with the Hardy Boys television series merely be-
cause articles and photos in the magazine were labeled as pertaining to
the "Hardy Boys."
79
Next, the New Kids court addressed the plaintiffs' misappropriation
claims.8 0 The court noted that "[t]he California Supreme Court has sub-
jected the 'right of publicity' under California law to a narrowing inter-
pretation which accords with First Amendment values.""' The court
adopted the defendants' argument that use of the New Kids' name and
likeness is protected by the first amendment unless such use is wholly
unrelated to news gathering and dissemination.82 The court relied upon
Midler v. Ford Motor Co.83 ("Midler") to reach its, conclusion.84 In Mid-
ler, the court addressed the issue of whether the first amendment shielded
the use of an imitator of Bette Midler's voice to sing the song "Do You
Want To Dance?" to advertise automobiles.8 Midler contended that
such use constituted a misappropriation of her right to publicity, while
Ford claimed inter alia, that its use of an imitation of her voice was pro-
75. Id.
76. 195 U.S.P.Q. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
77. New Kids, 745 F. Supp at 1545 n.6.
78. Universal, 195 U.S.P.Q. at 761.
79. Id. at 762.
80. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1545.
81. Id., (quoting Cher v. Forum Int'l Ltd., 692 F.2d at 638 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Gug-
lielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, 25 Cal. 3d 860, 873, 603 P.2d 454, 461-62, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 352, 359-60 (1979) (Bird, J. concurring))) (footnote omitted).
82. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1545-6.
83. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
84. 745 F. Supp. at 1545-46. The New Kids court also noted as relevant Robins v.
Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd,
447 U.S. 74 (1980). New Kids, 745 F. Supp at 1545 n.7. However, the court did not apply the
ruling in Pruneyard because the New Kids court focused exclusively upon a federal first amend-
ment analysis which it deemed was dispositive of all issues. Id. at 1543.
85. Midler, 849 F.2d at 461-462.
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tected by the first amendment.86 In concluding that Ford's use of Mid-
ler's voice was not protected, the court held
[t]he purpose of the media's use of a person's identity is central.
If the purpose is "informative or cultural" the use is immune;
"if it serves no such function but merely exploits the individual
portrayed, immunity will not be granted."8 7
While the New Kids court noted that total commercial exploitation
is precluded, 8 the court explained that commercial exploitation of a pub-
lic figure's name and likeness is allowed in the context of a publication's
advertising under California law.89 The court then applied the standard
in Midler to the facts of New Kids and found the defendants' use to be
descriptive, related to news gathering and not merely commercial ex-
ploitation.' ° The court concluded that such usage is constitutionally
protected.91
The court did, however, explicitly explain that its ruling should not
be interpreted to mean that the first amendment provides absolute immu-
nity for tortious conduct in connection with news gathering and dissemi-
nation.92 In fact, the court acknowledged that "[h]ad the plaintiffs
shown that USA Today or Star Magazine began running a 900-number
in a manner that was wholly unrelated to news gathering and reporting,
the First Amendment would provide no protection." 93 The court then
listed some examples of what it deemed would constitute such usage.94
The court acknowledged that the defendants' 900-number services
could be construed as commercial enterprises distinguishable from their
news publication businesses. 95 Yet the court ultimately rejected New
Kids' contention that the defendants' method of gathering information
constituted a collateral commercial enterprise outside the protection of
86. Id.
87. Id at 462 (quoting, Felcher and Rubin, Privacy, Publicity and the Portrayal of Real
People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1596 (1979)).
88. New Kid 745 F. Supp. at 1546 (citing Midler, 849 F.2d 460).
89. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1546 (citing Guglielmi, 25 Cal. 3d at 873, 603 P.2d at 462,
160 Cal. Rptr. at 360).
90. New Kids; 745 F. Supp. at 1546.
91. d
92. Id. at 1547.
93. Id.
94. Id. The court stated "[flor example, if the defendants provided 900-number services
that had no relation to any proposed article or continued running the 900-number service past
the time of the publication of the article, plaintiffs could sustain their burden of showing that a
defendants' [sic] use of the New Kids name was not related to a protected First Amendment
activity and constituted commercial exploitation." Id.
95. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1546.
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the first amendment.96 The court reiterated that neither federal97 nor
California98 courts have decided first amendment protection cases based
on whether the expressing actor's activity is profitable or unprofitable. 99
Finally, the court dismissed the New Kids' claim that it should ap-
ply the ruling in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co. '("Zacchini").1 In Zacchini, the defendant television station
broadcasted the entire fifteen second act of plaintiff Zacchini being shot
out of a cannon.'0 2 Zacchini contended that the broadcast constituted a
violation of his right to publicity. 103 The Court agreed and held that the
first amendment did not immunize the television station's use during its
newscast."° The New Kids court noted that in Zacchini, the Supreme
Court weighed the first amendment rights of the television station against
the Zacchini's right to earn a livelihood, and found that the broadcast of
the daredevil's entire act posed a substantial threat to the economic value
of that performance.105 The court in New Kids declined to apply
Zacchini, however, because the court found no analogous threat to the
economic value of the New Kids name."°
IV. ANALYSIS
The New Kids court consolidated its discussion of the plaintiffs'
eleven causes of action brought against each defendant into a single opin-
ion addressing two broad lines of inquiry.0 7 The first question was
whether the defendants infringed New Kids' federal and state statutory
and common law trademark rights. 108 The second inquiry addressed
whether the defendants' actions constituted a misappropriation of the
New Kids' right to publicity."° This section examines the court's dis-
96. Id.
97. Id. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952).
98. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1546 (citing Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, 25
Cal. 3d 860, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d 454 (1979)).
99. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1546.
100. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
101. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1547.
102. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 563-64.
103. Id. at 564.
104. Id. at 578-79.
105. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1547 (quoting Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575).
106. Id. at 1547.
107. Id. at 1542-3.
108. Id. at 1543-45.
109. Id. at 1545-47. Actions claiming a violation of right to publicity may in fact encom-
pass several common law actions such as unfair competition, J. MCCARTHY, RIGHTS OF PUB-
LICITY & PRIVACY § 4.14[C], at 4-87 (1989) and misappropriation, Id. at note 1, § 5.6 [A] at
5-48.1 through 5-49. In New Kids, the court determined that the plaintiffs' common law mis-
1991]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
cussion of both theories and finds its reasoning flawed. This section also
discusses the court's decision to address the plaintiffs' claims against both
Star Magazine and USA Today in one opinion and concludes that such a
consolidation was inappropriate. Finally, this section addresses a poten-
tial conflict between first amendment rights and intangible property
rights created by the New Kids court's reasoning.
A. Trademark Infringement Analysis
1. The Court's Misplaced Reliance Upon Rogers v. Grimaldi
Although the New Kids court relied heavily upon Rogers to resolve
the trademark infringement claims, 1 ' this reliance is ill founded. The
court's expansive application of the test in Rogers misreads the Rogers
court's opinion and, in effect, creates a sweeping new test apparently ap-
plicable whenever conflicts arise between intangible property rights and
the first amendment."' The creation of a new standard seems particu-
larly unwarranted, however, because the Rogers opinion does not indi-
cate an intention to abandon the rule in Lloyd or to establish a new test
ubiquitously applicable to all forms of speech." 2 In fact, the language in
Rogers clearly indicates a narrow holding addressing the rare instances
where the title of an artistic work relates to the persona of a celebrity."'
This intent is evidenced by the Rogers court's careful choice of limiting
language stating that "in the context of titles, [the] 'no alternative' stan-
dard provides insufficient leeway for literary expression."' 14 Conse-
quently, Rogers did not entirely reject the balancing test used in Lloyd.
Instead, the Rogers court merely determined that the Lloyd test was in-
appropriate in the context of titles because the Lloyd test would unduly
constrict literary expression.' 5
The Rogers court also distinguished Lloyd by utilizing the distinc-
tion between property rights claims which impose restrictions upon the
location of speech and those which impose restrictions upon the artistic
appropriation claim, its commercial misappropriation claim under CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344
and its claim of interference with prospective economic advantage fit under a theory of misap-
propriation of publicity rights. 745 F. Supp. 1540, 1543 n.3.
110. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1541.
S11. See infra notes I 1-138 and accompanying text.
112. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
113. Id. Cf Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 886 F.2d
490 (1989) (Rogers' balancing approach held to be applicable to Lanham Act claims against
works of artistic expression, including parody). Id. at 494-95.
114. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999 (emphasis added).
115. Id.
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content of speech." 6 Using this distinction, the Rogers court implied
that the Lloyd test is applicable to property claims which restrict the
location of speech, but not for property claims which restrict the artistic
content of speech in the context of titles. 17 In the context of titles, the
Rogers court held that a balancing test is appropriate for conflicting
property claims which restrict the artistic content of speech." Thus, the
Rogers court determined that the Lanham Act "should be construed to
apply to artistic works only where the public interest in avoiding con-
sumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression." I 9 Ap-
plying this balancing test, however, the Rogers court expressly limited
the scope of its holding, stating that
[i]n the context of allegedly misleading titles using a celebrity's
name, that balance will normally not support application of the
Act unless the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying
work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the
title explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the
work. 1
20
Thus, the court in Rogers clearly did not intend that its balancing test
supplant the application of the Lloyd test in any context other than
where artistic expression is at issue. 121
The New Kids court's reliance upon Rogers is also inappropriate be-
cause the reasoning underlying the Rogers decision is pertinent to artistic
expression and not news gathering. 122 The New Kids court said that
"[a]lthough Rogers concerned First Amendment values in the context of
artistic expression, the First Amendment plays the same central role re-
garding news gathering and dissemination."' 23 While the first amend-
ment plays a central role regarding news gathering, 24 the role is not
116. Id
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999,
120. Id. (emphasis added). In addition, a further indication of the Rogers court's intention
to limit the range of its holding can be derived from the court's statement that its limiting
construction of the Lanham Act would not apply to cases where misleading titles are confus-
ingly similar because the public interest in preventing consumer confusion would outweigh the
public's interest in permitting authors to use titles in such a manner. Thus, the court in Rogers
clearly did not intend that its balancing test supplant the application of the Lloyd test in any
context other than where artistic expression is at issue. Id. at n.5.
121. Rogers, 875 F.2d. at 999.
122. Id. at 997.
123. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1544 (emphasis added).
124. Daily Herald v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 384 (9th Cir. 1988) (The first amendment pro-
tects the media's right to gather news). See In re Express News Corp., 695 F.2d 807 (5th Cir.
1991]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
automatically the same when applied to the narrow context of artistic
expression at issue in Rogers, and vice versa.
In Rogers, the court determined that liability under the Lanham Act
would only be found if the defendant's usage of either had no artistic
relevance to the underlying work or the use was explicitly misleading.'25
In New Kids, the court apparently analogized news gathering to artistic
expression and applied a hybridized version of the Rogers test.' 26 As a
result, the court in New Kids held that in the context of news gathering,
liability under the Lanham Act would only be found if the "defendants
explicitly and falsely denoted authorship, sponsorship, or endorsement
by the New Kids[,] . . . explicitly mislead as to content,"'' 27 or use the
mark in a manner that has no relevance to news gathering.
28
The Supreme Court's ruling in Zacchini demonstrates, however,
that the standard adopted by the New Kids court is not well-founded. '
29
In Zacchini, the Court held that the plaintiff's recovery for violation of
his right to publicity was not precluded by the press' first amendment
right to gather news.' 3° If the Rogers test is applied to the facts of
Zacchini, however, an opposite result seems inevitable. The plaintiff in
Zacchini, did not contend that his daredevil cannon act was not news-
worthy.' 3 ' Furthermore, Zacchini did not assert that the broadcast was
explicitly misleading. Since the use of Zacchini's act was related to news
gathering and dissemination and did not explicitly mislead, using the
New Kids court's hybridized version of the Rogers test, 32 the television
station's usage of the plaintiff's persona in Zacchini should have been
protected by the first amendment. The United States Supreme Court
held to the contrary, however, and ruled in favor of Zacchini's intellec-
tual property rights, despite the acknowledgment of news gathering rele-
vance and an absence of explicit misleading. ' 3 ' The Supreme Court's
holding in Zacchini requires the corollary conclusion that the first
amendment is not as broad a shield against liability for infringement of
intangible property rights when news gathering is involved as the opinion
in New Kids indicates.
1982) ("[W]ithout some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be
eviscerated.").
125. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
126. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1545-46.
127. Id. at 1545.
128. Id. at 1547.
129. 433 U.S. at 575 (1977).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 569.
132. See supra notes 125-128 and accompanying text.
133. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 562-63.
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Although Zacchini addressed the issue of the scope of first amend-
ment protection for news gathering in the context of misappropriation of
right to publicity,' 34 the Court's ruling is instructive on the issue of the
appropriate scope of application of the Rogers test to Lanham Act claims
under circumstances such as those in New Kids. 135 The right to public-
ity is generally considered to be a potentially more expansive protection
of intangible property rights than the Lanham Act.'36 This is primarily
because the right of publicity, unlike the Lanham Act, has no likelihood
of confusion requirement. 137 As the court in Rogers stated "[p]erhaps for
that reason, courts delineating the right of publicity, more frequently
than in applying the Lanham Act, have recognized the need to limit the
right to accommodate First Amendment concerns."' 13 ' Thus, because
the ruling in Zacchini demonstrates that the Rogers test is inappropriate
for right to publicity cases involving news gathering, it would be incon-
sistent to apply the Rogers test to Lanham Act cases involving news gath-
ering. The court, therefore, erred in importing the Rogers test and
applying it to the trademark infringement claims in New Kids, where the
usage of the plaintiffs' trademark was claimed to involve protected news
gathering and dissemination and not artistic expression.
139
2. The Court's Finding That All Of The Defendants' Actions Were
Protected News Gathering Was Incorrect.
In New Kids, the court determined that the actions of both defend-
ants were related to news gathering.'" As a result, the court held that
the first amendment immunized Star Magazine and USA Today from the
plaintiffs' claims of trademark infringement."'
134. Id. at 565.
135. See infra text accompanying notes 136-139.
136. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004. (See Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Impli-
cations of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 158,
160-66 (1982)).
137. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004 (citing Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Im-
plications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. REV.
158, 160-66 (1982)).
138. Id.
139. Even if the right to publicity enjoyed a greater scope of protection outside the ambit of
the first amendment than does trademark protection, this analysis should allow plaintiffs to
prevail on their claims of misappropriation of right to publicity. See infra text accompanying
notes 179-186.
140. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1547.
141. Id. at 1541, 1547.
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a. The court should have found that the defendants' articles were
advertisements.
In New Kids, the plaintiffs argued that the actions of Star Magazine
and USA Today did not constitute news gathering protected by the first
amendment.1 42 Claiming that "[t]his is not a case about communication;
it is a case about remuneration,"1 43 the plaintiffs contended that the "ar-
ticles" published by the magazine were merely advertisements for their
900-numbers and, as such, were not entitled to expansive first amend-
ment protection.144
Courts have held that the purpose of the media's use of a trademark
or a person's likeness is crucial to the determination of whether misuse of
tradename or likeness has occurred. 45 First amendment protection is
not afforded the press if trademark or likeness use is merely a subterfuge
for commercial exploitation. 46 Thus, the court was called upon to deter-
mine whether the defendants' articles were either bona fide attempts to
gather news, disguised advertisements, or a hybrid of both.'47
Courts have broadly construed what constitutes protected "news
gathering."'' 48 However, in Daily Herald Co. v. Munro 49 ("Munro"),
the court did define one limitation by stating that "[n]ewsgathering is not
commercial speech; commercial speech '"does 'no more than propose a
commercial transaction.' " ' "150 Thus, if the actions of the defendants
constituted only commercial speech, that is, merely proposing a transac-
tion, such actions should not be regarded as news gathering.' 5 ' Courts
142. Id. at 1543.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462.
146. Arrington v. The New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433, 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1322, 449
N.Y.S.2d 941 (N.Y. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983) (publisher of a photograph illus-
trating a newspaper article is not liable for misuse of tradename or person's likeness unless the
usage has no relationship to the article or unless the article is an advertisement in disguise).
See also Rand v. Hearst Corp., 31 A.D.2d 406, 298 N.Y.S.2d 405, 410 (1969) (use of a public
figure's name on the cover of a book is protected by the first amendment unless the usage is
merely a commercial exploitation of the figure's personality).
147. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1547.
148. See Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1968) (scope of subject matter considered newsworthy has been defined in the most far
reaching terms); Arrington v. New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433, 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1322
(1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983) (the term "public interest" is to be freely defined).
149. 838 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1988).
150. Munro, 838 F.2d at 384 n.4 (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S.
60, 66 (1983) (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc. 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
151. Munro, 838 F.2d at 384 n.4.
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have long held that advertisements constitute commercial speech. 152 An
obvious corollary is that "article[s] ... may be nothing more than some-
one's advertisement in disguise."' 53 Thus, to the extent that the "arti-
cles" published by USA Today and Star Magazine constituted mere
advertisements, they fell outside the ambit of what can be deemed to be
news gathering.
In reaching its decision, the New Kids court failed to recognize the
predominant advertising character of the defendants' articles and over-
emphasized their minimal news gathering character. New Kids cor-
rectly argued that the defendants' "articles" contained many
characteristics of advertisements.' 54 The most significant of these char-
acteristics, however, was the virtual absence of any text in the "articles"
other than the solicitations to call.' 55 Additionally, the plaintiffs argued
that the use of 900-numbers instead of standard telephone or toll free
800-line services further indicated that the articles were merely advertise-
ments specifically designed to promote the 900-line service itself.'56 New
Kids argued that the use of 900-numbers belied the true nature of the
enterprise which, the plaintiffs claimed, was to "commercially misappro-
priate the goodwill created by the New Kids, and to capitalize on the
public's familiarity with the goods and services identified by [their]
mark."
57
The court erred in failing to characterize the "articles" as advertise-
152. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n., 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (the U.S.
Supreme Court characterized employment advertisements as "classic examples of commercial
speech"). Id. at 385. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
153. Griffin v. Medical Soc. of State of New York, 7 Misc. 2d 549, 550, 11 N.Y.S.2d 109,
110 (1939).
154. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant News
America Publishing Inc.'s Motion For Summary Judgment at 29-30, New Kids on the Block
v. News America Publishing, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1540 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (No. CV 90-1376 WJR
(JRx)).
155. Id. The USA Today advertisement contained a photograph of the band, the solicita-
tion to call, the cost of the call, the times the lines would be open, and a caveat to callers to
inform their parents of the call. USA Today Feb. 7, 1990 at 1, col 2. Star Magazine's adver-
tisement featured a photograph of the band, the headline query of "Now which kid is the
sexiest?," the question "So which of the New Kids on the Block would you most like to move
next door?" followed by "Star wants to know which cool New Kid is the hottest with our
readers," followed by the names, ages and instruments played by each band member and in-
structions of how to "vote." Star Magazine, Mar. 6, 1990.
156. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant News
America Publishing Inc.'s Motion For Summary Judgment at 29-30, New Kids on the Block
v. News America Publishing, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1540 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (No. CV 90-1376 WJR
(JRx)); New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1543.
157. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant Gan-
nett Satellite Information Network, Inc.'s Motion For Summary Judgment at 5, New Kids on
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ments for two reasons. First, when used for polling purposes, the only
beneficial difference between a 900-line and either an 800-line or a stan-
dard telephone line is that a 900-line can generate income, whereas the
others can not.'58 Consequently, a reasonable inference can be drawn
that the defendants' choice to use a 900-line was, at least to a significant
extent, precisely because the lines had the potential to generate in-
come. 59 Thus, the defendants' publication of their 900-lines could be
characterized, at least in large part, as commercial offers made to pro-
spective callers to purchase the services represented in the articles with
the purpose of generating income for the defendants. Published offers to
sell services with the aim of generating income are a form of advertising
in the purist sense.'"
The second reason why the court should have found that the defend-
ants' "articles" were merely advertisements and not sincere attempts to
gather news derives once again from scrutiny of the defendants' choice to
use 900-numbers as vehicles with which to conduct their "polls." Most
900-line surveys contain inherent problems of inaccuracy which toll-free
or standard lines do not.' 6 ' For example, common sense would indicate
the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1540 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (No. CV 90
1378 WJR (JRx))
158. "Technologically, anything that can be done using a 900-number service can also be
done using an 800-number or standard telephone service." Declaration of Rick Parkhill in
Support of Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant
Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, New Kids
on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1540 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (No. CV
90-1378 WJR (JRx)). "The primary reason for employing 900-number services is to generate
revenue." Id.
159. "The main reason for using a 900-number service is to generate revenue. If a service
subscriber did not want to make a profit, the subscriber should choose a less expensive way to
set up the service, for example, 800-number service." Declaration of Rick Parkhill in Support
of Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant Gannett
Satellite Information Network, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, New Kids on the
Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1540 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (No. CV 90-1378
WJR (JRx)).
160. To "advertise" is defined as
[t]o ... announce .... give notice of, inform, make known, publish. On call to the
public attention by any means whatsoever. Any oral, written, or graphic statement
made by the seller in any manner in connection with the solicitation of business and
includes, without limitation because of enumeration, statements and representations
made in a newspaper or other publication or . . contained in any notice...
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 50 (5th ed. 1979). "Advertisement" is defined as "[n]otice
given in a manner designed to attract public attention. Edwards v. Lubbock County,
Tex.Civ.App., 33 S.W.2d 482, 484. Information communicated to the public, or to an individ-
ual concerned, as by handbills, newspaper, television, billboards, radio. First Nat. Corporation
v. Perrine, 99 Mont. 454, 43 P.2d 1073, 1077." Id.
161. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant Gan-
nett Satellite Information Network, Inc.'s Motion For Summary Judgment at 23, New Kids on
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that a charge of only fifty cents per minute in addition to the standard
cost of a call would serve as a disincentive to lower income callers, thus
skewing results.162 The defendants attempted to counter this criticism,
however, by claiming that 900-lines are actually more accurate than their
standard or toll-free counterparts because the additional charge acts to
discourage repeat callers who would skew the results. 63 But this argu-
ment ignores the fact that the defendants could have eliminated the mul-
tiple voting problem without resorting to 900-lines. For example, the
defendants could have utilized caller identification technology on their
telephone survey lines to screen out previous calls from the same tele-
phone number and exclude them from the tabulated results.1 4 Conse-
quently, the court erred in failing to recognize that the so called
"articles" published by the defendants functioned predominantly as ad-
vertisements for commercial phone services which had only incidental
and inaccurate polling utility.
165
the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1540 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (No. CV 90
1378 WJR (JRx)).
162. Id.
163. Defendant Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc.'s Notice of Motion and Mo-
tion For Summary Judgment; Memorandum Of Points and Authorities at 4 n.2, New Kids on
the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1540 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (No. CV 90
1378 WJR (Gx)).
164. Caller identification technology allows the receiver of a phone call to ascertain the
caller's telephone number. The defendants could have employed "caller i.d." circuitry to iden-
tify the telephone numbers of the "voters" responding to their surveys. Relatively simple
software modifications of the defendants' telephonic information devices would allow the stor-
age and utilization of this data to prevent the recounting of subsequent calls from a previously
identified line. Thus, the defendants could have effectively solved the problem of repeat callers
skewing survey results while using only standard or 800-type lines. In fact, this system may be
more effective in solving the repeat caller problem than a market driven solution because some
repeat callers may not find the price of the services a sufficient disincentive to refrain from
repeat voting. Interview with Warren Jason, telephone information service equipment broker,
December 14, 1990. "The usual range of tolls charged for participating in a 900-number poll
does not necessarily discourage multiple voting. For many people, the cost is nominal and the
phone company will not disconnect anyone's phone service for failure to pay 900-number
charges." Declaration of Rick Parkhill in Support of Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Opposition to Defendant Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc.'s Motion
for Summary Judgment at 4, New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 745 F.
Supp. 1540 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (No. CV 90-1378 WJR (JRx)).
165. Another unfortunate result of the court's decision is the fact that the opinion can also
be interpreted as condoning unethical journalistic practices. This is because accuracy of dis-
seminated information has been recognized as an important part of journalistic ethics. Brown
v. Kelly Broadcasting 48 Cal. 3d 711, 748-49, 771 P.2d. 406, 430, 257 Cal. Rptr. 708, 732
(1989). Thus, continued use of 900-numbers by USA Today and Star Magazine as a means of
gathering news and representing the data gathered as news would violate one of their profes-
sion's cannons of ethics because of the inherent inaccuracy of data compiled by 900-line pol-
ling methods. See supra text accompanying note 162.
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b. The court erred in applying the same reasoning to both Star
Magazine and USA Today.
Even if the court in New Kids was correct in its assessment that the
advertisement and telephonic survey conducted by USA Today was re-
lated to news gathering, the court certainly erred in its determination
that all of Star Magazine's usage of the New Kids' trademark and per-
sonality were related to bona fide news gathering.' 66 Unlike USA Today,
Star Magazine used its 900-line to promote its entertainment trivia game,
another of Star Magazine's commercial 900-lines.' 67 This distinction is
significant because Star Magazine's trivia game's promotion was thus ef-
fected by the usage of the New Kids' name and popularity. Specifically,
Star Magazine's "article" was used to stimulate caller participation to
"vote" for a New Kid, then such participation was exploited to market
Star Magazine's separate commercial service.' 68
The New Kids court failed to recognize that from the moment a
solicited caller's "vote" is cast, presumably at the instant telephone com-
puter equipment registers the "vote," any on-line marketing of other
commercial ventures should be deemed purely commercial speech and
not protected news gathering. Thus the court in New Kids should not
have granted Star Magazine's motion for summary judgment.
3. The Court's Application of Rogers to the Facts of New Kids Leads
to Legal Absurdities.
The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment
after concluding that New Kids had failed to meet any of the requisites
for trademark infringement.' 69 The court determined the infringement
criteria upon a hybrid of the test set forth in Rogers. 7' Consequently,
the court stated that the plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact showing that the defendants' use of 900-lines was "unrelated to
news gathering and dissemination."' 7' But the court erred by applying
the Rogers test to a case where news gathering, not artistic expression,
was at issue. 172 Additionally, even if the Rogers test could be interpreted
166. See infra notes 167-168 and accompanying text.
167. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1542, 1545 n.5.
168. Id.; Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant
News America Publishing Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, New Kids on the Block
v. News America Publishing, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1540 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (No. CV 90 1376 WJR
(JRx)).
169. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1545.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See supra notes 111-139 and accompanying text.
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to apply to news gathering cases, the court should have found that the
defendants' use of the New Kids' trademark was not realistically related
to serious news gathering.
173
Most distressing, however, is the fact that the court's compound er-
rors of misadapting the Rogers test and neglecting the overwhelming
commercial nature of the defendants use of the New Kids mark, when
taken together, inevitably lead to legal absurdity. 174  For example, the
Lanham Act would prohibit a newspaper business not licensed to use the
trademarks of Levis, Lee, Jordache, and Guess to place these trademarks
on four different types of jeans and offer the jeans for sale. 17 If the rea-
soning of the New Kids court is employed however, trademark laws could
be easily circumvented by the attachment of a disclaimer that the news-
paper had labeled the jeans and was selling them to determine which
clothing manufacturer was the most popular on the basis of the "votes"
cast in the form of sales for each type of jean. This absurdity results
from the New Kids court applying the Rogers standard for infringement
in artistic expression cases to news gathering cases. Specifically, since
Rogers, requires that there be no relationship of the trademark usage to
underlying artistic expression for infringement to occur, 1 76 the New Kids
court's substitution of "news gathering" for "artistic expression," results
in a standard which requires that there be no relationship of the usage to
news gathering for infringement to be found. 77  Since every transaction
could be deemed to have some news gathering relevance simply because
the transaction occurred, and since a disclaimer could deflect a claim of
explicit misleading, the application of the Rogers test in trademark ac-
tions involving news gathering could create a first amendment exception
with the practical effect of obliterating trademark protection. The ab-
surdity of this result is amplified when one considers that while an offer
to sell jeans would be related to news gathering, it almost certainly could
173. See supra notes 142-165 and accompanying text.
174. See infra notes 175-177 and accompanying text.
175. The Lanham Act prohibits the use in connection with any goods or services "any
word, term, name, symbol or device.., which is likely to cause confusion, or.. . mistake...
as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the
origin, sponsorship or approval of his or her goods, services or commercial activities..." 15
U.S.C. § 1125. To determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists the court will weigh
several factors: "(1) the strength or weakness of the marks; (2) the similarity in appearance,
sound, and meaning; (3) the class of goods in question; (4) the marketing channels; (5) evi-
dence of actual confusion; and (6) evidence of the intention of the defendant in selecting and
using the alleged infringing name." Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175,
1179 (9th Cir. 1988). Since all these marks are strong, and the putative user's are identical to
them and the class goods is the same, owners infringement would almost certainly be found.
176. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
177. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1547.
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not be deemed to be the type of news gathering that the courts have here-
tofore held deserving of full first amendment protection because such of-
fers have been deemed to constitute commercial speech.
1 78
B. Misappropriation Analysis
The court in New Kids predicated its misappropriation analysis
upon the finding that the usage of the plaintiffs' persona was protected
news gathering and dissemination and not mere exploitation of the indi-
viduals portrayed.179 The court held that because of the news gathering
character of the defendants' usage of the plaintiffs' persona, such use was
"protected by the First Amendment unless such use is wholly unrelated
to constitutionally protected news gathering and dissemination."18 The
court's finding that all of the defendants' usage of the New Kids persona
was related to news gathering is suspect.18' But even if the defendants'
usage was related to bona fide news gathering, the court in New Kids still
erred in its analysis.
The New Kids court stated that "California courts have specifically
allowed incidental commercial exploitation of a public figure's name and
likeness in the context of a publication's advertising activities."' 82
Although not explicitly stated, the court concluded that the defendants'
usage was merely an incidental commercial exploitation of the New Kids
persona relevant to news gathering.183 The court failed, however, to ac-
knowledge that the commercial exploitation of the New Kids' persona
was not simply confined to the context of the defendants' advertising ac-
tivities, but was, in large part, a usage identical to that of the plaintiffs':
to advertise a commercial New Kids 900-line. Thus, Star Magazine and
USA Today were in competition with the New Kids in the same market
offering virtually the same product. Such usage is not a mere "incidental
commercial exploitation of. . .name and likeness in the context of a
publication's advertising activities."' 84 More importantly, however, this
distinction mirrors the competing interests of Zacchini and the news
show producers that broadcast his live human cannonball act. Thus,
178. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (quoting Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
179. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1545-46.
180. Id.
181. See supra notes 112-178 and accompanying text.
182. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1546 (citing Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, 25
Cal. 3d 860, 873, 603 P.2d 454, 462, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 360 (1979)). See CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3344(d) (1988).
183. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1546.
184. Id.
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New Kids would fall directly under the rule of Zacchini despite the ex-
press assertion of the court in New Kids to the contrary. ' 5
In Zacchini, the news broadcast of the daredevil's entire human can-
nonball act was found to pose "a substantial threat to the economic value
of that performance." ''"6 Similarly, the appropriation of the New Kids
persona to advertise a commercial 900-line service poses a substantial
threat to the economic value of the New Kids' hotline, both directly, by
use of the New Kids personality to promote a competing service, and
indirectly by appropriating the New Kids persona itself. Consequently,
the New Kids court incorrectly distinguished Zacchini and inappropri-
ately constricted the plaintiffs' right to publicity.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
To resolve the plaintiffs' trademark claims, the court should have
employed the rule in Lloyd and decided the case utilizing the "alternative
channels" standard." 7 Using this test, the court could have arrived at
the same conclusion by determining that if the defendants are not al-
lowed to recover reasonable costs associated with news gathering via the
use of a 900-line service, a "chilling effect" upon the exercise of first
amendment rights could result.' 8 Specifically, the court might have
found that to restrict the defendants' ability to conduct surveys with a
900-line telephone service could leave some news gatherers without ade-
quate alternative channels of news collection. 8 9 Additionally, this rea-
soning would not be inconsistent with a determination that the
utilization of some alternate channels such as 800-lines, standard service
telephone lines or mail may be prohibitively expensive, thereby chilling
the free exercise of first amendment news gathering in some instances.' 90
185. Id. at 1547.
186. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575.
187. Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 567.
188. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 50 (1970).
189. It is unlikely that large newspapers such as Star Magazine and USA Today could not
afford to expend resources for alternatives to 900-number polling. However, if the defendants
could show that the sample they were interested in could only be effectively polled by tele-
phone (because, for example, the target population does not respond adequately to mail ques-
tionnaires or live polling), then the defendants' 900-number polling may well be without
reasonable alternatives to 900-number polling.
190. For example, with respect to telephonic surveys, it is reasonable to infer that the cost
of a 900-line call probably acts as a disincentive to call versus a free line, thus skewing survey
results toward those who could afford the call. But an 800-number that is toll-free to the
consumer would result in charges to the 800-line subscriber. Interview with Mary Calloway,
ATI" Readyline Services, Dec. 27, 1990. A subscriber news gatherer would be responsible for
the expense of the poll respondents' calls made to such an 800-line. But a price incentive (free
calls to the consumer) could, in some cases, result in a volume of calls which would be prohibi-
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Thus, utilization of the rule in Lloyd would have allowed the court to
more appropriately balance the trademark rights of the plaintiffs with the
public interest in the maximum production and protection of news gath-
ering and dissemination.
Since the plaintiffs' misappropriation of publicity and, statutory and
common law trademark claims arose under state law,19 1 the New Kids
court should have applied the precedent set out in Robins v. Pruneyard
Shopping Center 192 ("Pruneyard,").193 In that case, the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the California Supreme Court's narrowing of
property rights by interpreting California's Constitution as providing a
greater protection of speech than the federal Constitution.' 9 In
Pruneyard, '9 students who sought to solicit support for their opposition
to a United Nations resolution against "Zionism," set up a card table in a
shopping center's central courtyard, distributed pamphlets and asked
pedestrians to sign petitions.' 96 A shopping center security guard told
the students that their activity violated the shopping center's regulations
and asked them to leave.' 97 The guard's superior suggested that the stu-
dents move to the public sidewalk at the shopping center's periphery.98
The students, who immediately left the premises, subsequently filed a
lawsuit to enjoin the shopping center from denying them access to the
tively costly to a news gatherer, where the lower volume 900-line would not. Id. It is conceiva-
ble that in some circumstances the revenue earning potential of a 900-line to recoup the cost of
news gathering may provide the only practical method for a news gatherer to conduct a partic-
ular news gathering. One jurist observed that, with respect to free expression, picketing may be
the poor man's equivalent of a printing press. United States v. Miller, 367 F.2d 72, 79 (2d Cir.
1966). Similarly, in some circumstances it may be reasonable to view 900-number surveys as
the poor man's Gallup Poll.
191. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1542-3. The court also acknowledged, but did not resolve a
dispute as to whether the plaintiffs stated a cause of action for dilution. Id. at 1542 n. 1. The
court stated, however, that its first amendment analysis would apply to such a claim if it
existed. Id. The court's statement is not well reasoned. See infra text to notes 192-219.
192. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
193. See supra note 84.
194. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 85 (1980). The California Constitution provides: "Every per-
son may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible
for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press." CAL.
CONST. ART. I, § 2. See also Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, N.Y. Ct. App. No. 264, Jan.
15, 1991. (New York Constitution's free speech guarantee shields otherwise libelous state-
ments that would lead a reasonable reader to consider the statements expressions of opinion
and not fact).
195. The defendant, Pruneyard Shopping Center, is a privately owned shopping center open
to the public which is comprised of walkways, plazas, sidewalks, and buildings that contain
specialty shops, restaurants, and a movie theater. 447 U.S. at 77.
196. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 77.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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have a real and substantial relation to the objective sought to be
attained."21
In Pruneyard, the Court held that the shopping center failed to
"provide sufficient justification for concluding that this test is not satis-
fied by the State's asserted interest in promoting more expansive rights of
free speech and petition than conferred by the Federal Constitution."12 1'
The Court distinguished its ruling in Lloyd, stating:
[o]ur reasoning in Lloyd... does not ex proprio vigore limit the
authority of the State to exercise its police power or its sover-
eign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties
more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitu-
tion . . . [i]n Lloyd . .. there was no state constitutional or
statutory provision that had been construed to create rights to
the use of private property by strangers, comparable to those
found to exist by the California Supreme Court [in
Pruneyard ].212
In Pruneyard, the Supreme Court also discounted the importance of the
availability of alternative channels of expression in sharp contrast to its
opinion in Lloyd, stating:
[a]lthough appellants contend there are adequate alternative
avenues of communication available for appellees, it does not
violate the United States Constitution for the State Supreme
Court to conclude that access to appellants' property in the
manner required here is necessary to the promotion of state-
protected rights of free speech and petition.21a
Like Pruneyard, Lloyd addressed a property owner's right to ex-
clude others from using the owner's real property for expressive pur-
poses. Yet, Lloyd has been applied to cases where intangible property
rights conflicted with federal free speech rights. 2 4 The New Kids court
could have used analogous reasoning to support an application of the
holding in Pruneyard to state intangible property rights claims, such as
misappropriation, where such claims conflict with free speech rights
granted by the California Constitution, as was the case in New Kids.
21 5
210. Id. at 85 (quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523, 525 (1934)). See also
Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of
Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 124-125 (1978).
211. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 84.
212. Id. at 81. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967); Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 569-570.
213. Id. at 85 n.8.
214. See supra note 12.
215. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1545.
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shopping center for the purpose of soliciting signatures for their
petitions. 199
Ruling in favor of the students, the California Supreme Court distin-
guished Lloyd 2°° and held that the California Constitution protects
speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even
when the center is privately owned, and that such a result does not in-
fringe the property owner's property rights protected by the federal
Constitution.2"'
The shopping center appealed,20 2 claiming, inter alia, that the ruling
amounted to a taking of its property without just compensation in viola-
tion of the taking clause of the federal Constitution.20 a The United States
Supreme Court affirmed the California decision.20 4 The Court stated
that "a State in the exercise of its police power may adopt reasonable
restrictions on private property so long as the restrictions do not amount
to a taking without just compensation or contravene any other federal
constitutional provision., 20 5 Noting that "not every destruction or in-
jury to property by governmental action has been held to be a 'taking' in
the constitutional sense,"20 6 the Court stated that
the determination whether a state law unlawfully infringes a
landowner's property in violation of the Taking Clause requires
an examination of whether the restriction on private property
"[forces] some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole. 2 7
The Court stated that such a determination required an "inquiry into
such factors as the character of the governmental action, its economic
impact, and its interference with reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions. ' 2 8 Noting that "[w]hen 'regulation goes too far it will be recog-
nized as a taking,' "209 the Court stated that ". . . [t]he guaranty of due
process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not be
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall
199. Pruneyard, 23 Cal. 3d at 903.
200. Id. at 905-906.
201. Id. at 910.
202. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 79.
203. Id. at 84.
204. Id. at 79.
205. Id. at 81.
206. Id. at 82. (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960)).
207. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 82-83 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960)).
208. Id. at 83 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)).
209. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
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Had the New Kids court applied the test set out in Pruneyard,2 16 it could
have concluded that the state's interest in promoting expansive free
speech rights outweighed the New Kids' property interests in their name
or likeness. While New Kids could argue that the use of their persona for
news gathering by 900-lines "goes too far" and constitutes a taking in
toto by virtue of the fact they too operated a 900-line,217 it is unlikely
such an argument would prevail. In Pruneyard the Court acknowledged
that "one of the essential sticks in the bundle of property rights is the
right to exclude others" 21 8 and that, with respect to the owners of the
shopping center, "there has literally been a "taking" of that right.
21 9
Nevertheless, the Court held that California's interest in promoting free
speech outweighed that essential property interest.22 If the New Kids
court similarly balanced the New Kids' property interests against the
state's interest in promoting free speech it seems likely that, given the
result in Pruneyard, the state's interest would prevail. Thus, the New
Kids court could have used the California Supreme Court's ruling in
Pruneyard to resolve the plaintiffs' right to publicity claims, and reached
the same result, but without the aforementioned contortions of reasoning
and misinterpretation of precedent employed in the New Kids opinion.
This reasoning would at least apply to the claims against USA Today,
those against Star Magazine pose a somewhat different problem.
Even if the court had employed alternate analysis, suggested here,
the court should still distinguish Star Magazine's use of its New Kids
survey line to promote its trivia game.221 Since such promotion amounts
to little more than commercial speech,22 2 the court should conclude that
use of the plaintiffs' trademark for any collateral commercial benefit be-
yond news gathering should be actionable.223 Similarly, purely commer-
cial use of the plaintiff's persona would probably fail under Pruneyard as
such use would not substantially further the state's interest in strengthen-
ing state created free speech rights.22 4
The court may find that the defendants' usage of the plaintiffs'
216. See supra notes 207-211 and accompanying text.
217. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1543.
218. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 82 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-
80 (1979)).
219. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 82.
220. Id. at 83.
221. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1542.
222. See supra notes 142-168 and accompanying text.
223. Id.
224. See supra notes 209-211 and accompanying text. This analysis would equally apply to
New Kids state and common law trademark claims and any state dilution claim as well. See
supra notes 205-210 and accompanying text.
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trademark or persona or likeness is not limited to constitutionally pro-
tected news gathering and dissemination but that some protected usage
has occurred. If this happens, an equitable solution would be to find
liability for infringement and/or misappropriation but award damages in
the amount of revenue generated beyond the costs conducting protected
news gathering and dissemination.
VI. CONCLUSION
The alternative channels standard set out in Lloyd is fair, workable,
and still good law. The court in New Kids should have used the rule in
Lloyd instead of generating a new standard by misadapting the rule in
Rogers to address New Kids' Lanham Act claims.225 Similarly, the court
should have decided the New Kids' misappropriation claims in accord-
ance with the rule in Zachinni, not Midler.226 Moreover, the court could
have reached the same result regarding USA Today, without misapplica-
tion of precedent by utilizing the broad free speech provision of the Cali-
fornia Constitution.
2 27
More troubling, than the court's creative application of precedent,
however, is the fact that the New Kids court failed to recognize that its
reasoning results in severely constricted intangible property rights and
opens a pandora's box of first amendment concerns. For example, if a
party's intangible property rights are subordinate to another's first
amendment rights upon a mere showing that the second party's use of
the intangible property is not completely unrelated to news gathering, 228
are real property rights similarly subordinated? If so, could intrusions
into the homes of private citizens by newspaper reporters be justified
upon a showing that the reporters were simply digging up news for pro-
spective articles?
Another concern arises from the court's expansion of the Midler test
to include first amendment protection of the use of another's name or
likeness if the use is not misleading and is simply related to the gathering
of information for dissemination to the public.229 If followed by other
courts, this reasoning could broaden the ambit of the first amendment far
beyond its current scope. For example, courts could allow the commer-
cial exploitation of a photograph of a person who is not a public figure,
without compensation to that person merely because the photograph re-
225. See supra notes 110-139 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 179-186 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 191-224 and accompanying text.
228. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1547.
229. Id. at 1546.
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corded the physical location and physical characteristics of the person at
a particular instant in time and that, in and of itself, could always be
construed to have some informational value. This reasoning could effec-
tively eviscerate state right to publicity laws.1
31
Yet, the New Kids court's finding of first amendment protection for
Star Magazine's and USA Today's usage of the New Kids trademark and
persona upon a determination that such use was newsworthy2 31 could
also constrict first amendment freedoms by allowing unwarranted judi-
cial encroachment on the editorial prerogatives of the press to determine
what is newsworthy. "A determination concerning. . . newsworthiness
. .. cannot help but be based on the content of the... message it deliv-
ers." 232 An application of the New Kids court's ruling would allow one
900-line poll to use otherwise protected trademarks, names and like-
nesses while another will be "disallowed solely because the Government
determines that the message being conveyed in the one is newsworthy...
while the message imparted by the other is not."'2 33 The permissibility of
the use of the trademark, name or likeness of another would often de-
pend "solely on the nature of the message being conveyed. ' 234 This
would result in a regulation of speech based upon its content. Thus, the
"newsworthiness" requirement imposed by the New Kids court235 is con-
stitutionally infirm because "[r]egulations which permit the Government
to discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be toler-
ated under the First Amendment.
2 z36
But perhaps the best exemplars of the court's faulty reasoning comes
from the court itself in the form of examples it gives to illustrate when
the court would find the use of the New Kids persona or trademark to be
wholly unrelated to news gathering.2 37 The first example the court cites
as outside the ambit of first amendment protection is the utilization of
the New Kids trademark or persona in relation to the operation of a 900-
number that is unrelated to any proposed article.2 3' But since news can
be gathered without any particular proposed article in mind and yet be-
come a part of some subsequent article, or since data may be collected
230. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
231. Id. at 1545.
232. Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648 (1984).
233. Id.
234. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980).
235. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1545.
236. Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. at 648-9 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. at 463). See
Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972).
237. See infra notes 238-246 and accompanying text.
238. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1547.
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which is subsequently disseminated in a manner unforeseen at the time of
the gathering,239 the court's first example contradicts its holding that use
of trademark and persona is protected unless such use is unrelated to
news gathering and dissemination.2" ° Similarly, the court's example
seems to prohibit professional pollsters from taking polls where the pur-
pose is simply for the sake of gathering data, or from gathering data and
offering it to third parties who may or may not choose to publish the
results. The court's example indicates that such pollsters would be pro-
hibited merely because the pollsters' efforts would not be related to any
specific proposed article. 24' Thus, while extending the scope of news
gathering protected under the first amendment to 900-number polling
technology, 24 2 the court's example would produce a chilling effect upon
the gathering of news in general by requiring that it be related to an
article a priori.243
The court's second example is equally flawed. The court states that
use of the New Kids mark or persona in conjunction with a 900-number
after publication of the news generated by the 900-number use of the
mark or persona would also not be protected by the first amendment. 2"
This example suffers from the same infirmity as the court's other example
because it fails to account for the fact that virtually all new data collec-
tion could rightly be construed as news simply by virtue of the fact that
the data was heretofore not collected. For instance, extrapolating from
the court's example, once a poll is taken using a 900-number and the
results are published, the poll taker would be prohibited from retaking
the poll.245 This would undoubtedly discourage poll takers from retak-
ing polls as a check for accuracy or as a resampling of opinion at some
future point in time. This, in turn, would conflict with one of the pur-
poses of the first amendment, to encourage an informed public.2 "
239. Interview with Tom Wilkinson, managing editor, Washington Post, Mar. 8, 1991. "We
expect people to gather information regardless of whether they have a particular story in mind.
It happens all the time. We expect that reporters are really reporting throughout their waking
hours and if they are in any situation where they can gather or process information that may
appear in any number of later stories without having any of those particular stories in mind,
they do so. That's just a given, and has been in this business for as long as I can remember. Id.
Note, however, that some journalists feel that ethical journalistic practices require that data be
collected with the intent to ultimately disseminate information. Interview with Terry
Schwadron, assistant managing editor of the Los Angeles Times, Mar. 8, 1991.
240. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1547.
241. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1547.
242. Id. at 1542.
243. Id. at 1547.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 302 (1951) ("[t]he purpose of constitutional protec-
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Thus, the New Kids opinion, through misapplication of precedent
and flawed reasoning, fails to appropriately protect intangible property
rights and disregards the serious first amendment consequences which
would flow from its decision if it is followed.
by G. Alexander Piccionelli
tion of speech is to foster peaceful interchange of all manner of thoughts, information and
ideas"). See also First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 530, 533 (1980).
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